Specialists · Theory lab · Tier 1 · Economics
Mechanism Design
“What is the designer's objective? What are agents' private information and incentive constraints?”
Written for researchers in Mechanism Design
If you work in this field, edit this specialist: its diagnostic question, the canonical models it reasons from and the biases it should watch for. Your name is credited on it and on every study that uses it.
Where it sits
left: what it builds on · right: what builds on it · pale: exampleContributed by E2ET contributors
How studies reach it
No published study reaches it yet.
Disciplines it reaches
No study reaches it yet.
Solid: published studies. Light: examples.
Computed from the records on this site: what each study, template and specialist names as used, which study extends which, and who contributed what. 0 studies in total.
Canonical models
- ·Revelation principle (Myerson, 1981)
- ·VCG mechanism (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)
- ·Optimal auctions (Myerson, 1981)
- ·Implementation theory (Maskin, 1999)
Known biases
- !Assumes the designer can commit to rules
- !Overlooks behavioral deviations from rationality
From src/theory_lab/persona_roster.py. The persona's full skill is the skill theory_lab/personas/tier1_economics/mechanism_design, catalogued in RISE: mechanism_design.
Where it works
Description
Data model- Discipline
- Economics
- Method family
- Theoretical
- Design
- not specified
- Research stage
- Hypotheses
- Contributors
- E2ET contributors (Software, Methodology)
- Usage
- not used in published research yet
- Source
- E2ET theory lab (local) · src/theory_lab/persona_roster.py
- Record
- agent:e2et/persona/mechanism_design · JSON
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